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Abstract 
Simulations are used to analyze welfare and market- and farm-level effects of making futures 
available to producers of a storable commodity. Key features of the model are the explicit 
consideration of dynamic impacts due to inventories, and of aggregate market effects associated 
with futures adoption by some producers. Application to the natural rubber market shows that 
futures availability can lead to sizeable market- and farm-level effects. Futures availability 
enhances consumer welfare, reduces non-adopter welfare, and yields important welfare gains for 
adopters when their market share is small and welfare losses when they account for a sufficiently 
large market share. 
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DO FUTURES BENEFIT FARMERS? 
 
Vulnerability to risks is among the most important problems faced by commodity producers in 
developing economies (see Roumasset, Boussard, and Singh 1979) and developed economies 
(see Just and Pope 2001) alike. Concerns with price risk have led countries to adopt schemes 
intended to stabilize prices (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). Similarly, governments have often 
underwritten crop insurance policies to curb producers’ yield risks (Hazell, Pomareda, and 
Valdez 1986, Coble and Knight 2001). 
Large-scale government-led price stabilization schemes have proven to be unsustainable 
(Gardner 1988, p. 303). For the specific case of the natural rubber market discussed later in the 
present article, Burger and Smit (2001) provide an account of the demise of the price support 
scheme originally set up by the International Natural Rubber Organization. Further, the adoption 
of such mechanisms in the future is likely to be hampered by agreements to liberalize agriculture 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (see World Trade Organization 2004). 
These facts may explain the recent interest in promoting the use of institutional markets, such as 
futures markets, to manage the price risks affecting commodity producers (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 1994 and 1998). An example of such interest is the 
International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries (ITF) 
convened by the World Bank. The ITF includes international institutions, producer and 
consumer organizations, major commodity exchanges, and commodity trading firms (ITF 1999, 
Annex 5). Succinctly, the ITF has recommended facilitating the use of market-based risk-
management instruments by developing country commodity producers (ITF 1999, Preface). 
The promotion of futures and other similar tools to manage commodity producers’ price 
risks is based on the assumption that they increase the well-being of their adopters. This 
assumption is valid from the standpoint of a single producer who adopts such tools, as he would 
not use them if they made him worse off. However, the assumption need not hold when many 
producers adopt risk-management tools simultaneously. This is true because the aggregation of   2
individual responses may adversely affect the commodity market as a whole (e.g., spot prices 
may fall if hedging induces an increase in adopter output). The first theoretical studies to 
specifically address this issue in the context of forward (as opposed to futures) markets for 
storable commodities were Kawai (1983) and Britto (1984) for storable commodities, and 
Turnovsky (1983) for nonstorable commodities. 
Conceptually, two approaches may be used to quantify the impact of futures on producer 
welfare, taking into account the aggregate effect of adopters’ decisions on the market. The first 
approach is to perform econometric estimation with historical data. Unfortunately, this method is 
unlikely to have much power due to the high volatility of many of the series involved (e.g., price 
and output) and the likely existence of structural changes (e.g., changes in production 
technology) in the past. Further, it requires data that usually are not available (e.g., long time 
series on individual producers’ behavior before and after adoption). Not surprisingly, there are 
no studies pursuing this line of research. 
The second approach consists of building economic models of the market(s) under 
analysis in terms of “deep parameters,” and simulating their behavior with and without futures 
markets. Otherwise, if some of the model’s parameters depended on the policy regimes under 
consideration, the analysis would be subject to the famous “Lucas’ critique” (Lucas 1976). Deep 
parameters are those unaffected by the policy intervention being studied. For example, weather 
variability is a deep parameter in the case of agricultural futures. In contrast, the variance of spot 
prices is not a deep parameter because it is endogenous, as it is affected by producers’ optimal 
production responses to the availability of futures. Disadvantages of the simulation approach are 
that its results are model-specific, and that they apply to real-world problems only insofar as the 
latter are realistically represented by the underlying economic model. To the best of our 
knowledge, Turnovsky and Campbell (1985) is the only previous attempt to use the simulation 
approach to analyze the welfare effects of introducing a forward market for a storable 
commodity. Lence and Hayes (2002) resorted to the simulation approach to analyze U.S. farm 
programs, but they did not allow for futures trading.   3
The main contributions of the present article are the incorporation of dynamics due to 
inventory effects and the consideration of the aggregate effects of futures adopters. The model is 
based on the rational storage paradigm (Williams and Wright 1991; Deaton and Laroque 1992, 
1996; Chambers and Bailey 1996), and incorporates realistic features not considered in the two 
studies most closely related to the present one, namely, Turnovsky (1983) and Turnovsky and 
Campbell (1985). In particular, the proposed model involves futures rather than forward markets, 
allows for stockouts, does not rely on a mean-variance framework, and accounts for the fact that 
futures need not be made available to (or be adopted by) all producers. By allowing for non-
adopters, we can quantify the changes in their optimal behavior and welfare induced by the other 
producers’ adoption of futures. 
In addition, we show how to apply the model for policy analysis purposes, by 
parameterizing it so as to represent the natural rubber market. Natural rubber is of practical 
interest because its price is volatile (ITF 2001), and the potential adoption of futures by natural 
rubber producers has attracted attention from academia (Zant 2001), as well as from the ITF (ITF 
2001). Zant (2001) analyzed the impact of making hedging tools available in India. He showed 
that the welfare of India’s natural rubber producers would increase substantially if hedging 
mechanisms were available. However, in calculating welfare effects, he took into account neither 
the market impact of the changes in farmers’ output decisions induced by the hedging scheme, 
nor the dynamic effects that are central to the present study. The ITF (2001) analyzed the 
feasibility of offering price insurance tools to natural rubber growers in Thailand. The ITF study 
assumed that many of Thailand’s natural rubber producers would greatly benefit from being able 
to reduce their price risks, but it did not attempt to quantify such welfare gains. 
 
A Theoretical Model for the Spot Market of a Storable Crop 
The present study focuses on the impact of making futures contracts available to some of the 
farmers who produce a storable crop. Such producers are labeled “adopters,” and the rest of the   4
farmers are referred to as “non-adopters.” The total crop supply at date t is given by total output 
plus carry-in storage (It): 
 
(1)  Total Crop Supply at Time t = nA qA,t + nN qN,t + It, 
 
where nA (nN) is the number of adopters (non-adopters), and qA,t (qN,t) is the average output per 
adopting (non-adopting) farmer. The crop can be used to satisfy demand for current consumption 
(Ct), or it can be purchased by speculators to store and resell in the future (It+1). Market 
equilibrium at time t requires that total supply be equal to total demand. That is, 
 
(2)  It+1 = nA qA,t + nN qN,t + It − Ct ≥ 0, 
 
where the inequality in (2) follows from the fact that storage cannot be negative. 
Solving for market equilibrium (2) requires specifying functional forms for the different 
components of market demand and supply. Such components are described next. 
 
Demand for Current Consumption 
Aggregate demand for current consumption (Ct) is postulated to be of a standard isoelastic form: 
 
(3)  Ct = δ0 
1 δ −
t P  εC,t, 
 
where Pt denotes the crop’s world price at time t, δ0 > 0 is a scaling parameter, δ1 > 0 is the 
elasticity of demand for current consumption, and εC,t > 0 is a random demand shock (e.g., a 
disturbance to income). Without loss of generality, the mean of the random shock is set equal to 
one (Mean(εC,t) = 1).
1 
 
   5
Demand for Speculative Stocks 
Demand for speculative purposes is driven by the expectation of making profits from storage. 
Under perfect competition, speculators’ (discounted) expected profits from buying one unit of 
the crop at time t, storing it, and selling it at t + 1 must satisfy condition (4) in equilibrium: 
 
(4)  Et(Pt+1)/(1 + r) − Pt − φ ≤ 0, 
 
where Et(⋅) is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t, r denotes 
the interest rate, and φ represents the cost of storing one unit of the crop for one period. If (4) 
does not hold, speculators will buy more units of the crop at time t with the purpose of selling 
them at time t + 1, which is inconsistent with equilibrium. 
When storage is expected to be unprofitable (i.e., [Et(Pt+1)/(1 + r) − Pt − φ] < 0), 
speculators will reduce their commodity holdings, thereby exerting downward pressure on 
current prices Pt and causing an upward revision in the next-period’s price expectations Et(Pt+1). 
However, such a process need not drive the left-hand side of (4) to zero because storage cannot 
be reduced below zero. It follows that equilibrium also implies that condition (5) must hold for 
speculative storage demand: 
 
(5) [Et(Pt+1)/(1 + r) − Pt − φ] × It+1 = 0, It+1 ≥ 0. 
 
Together, (4) and (5) define the demand for speculative storage (Deaton and Laroque 1992). 
 
Farmers’ Supply in the Absence of Futures Markets 
Crop output is assumed to be the result of farmers’ optimal decisions based on their underlying 
preferences and production technologies. Unfortunately, modeling heterogeneous populations of 
adopting and non-adopting farmers is intractable from a computational standpoint. Hence, the   6
analysis relies upon the characterization of a representative adopter and a representative non-
adopter. 
For both adopters and non-adopters, the amount of crop produced by farmers of type j at 
time t (qj,t) is equal to the product of farmers’ planned output as of time t – 1 (xj,t−1 ≡ Et−1(qj,t)) 
and a time-t output shock εqj,t > 0: 
 
(6)  qj,t = xj,t−1 εqj,t, 
 
for j = A and N. By construction, the random output shock must have a mean equal to one 
(Mean(εqj,t) = Et−1(εqj,t) = 1).
2 At time t – 1, type-j farmers choose the level of planned output 
xj,t−1 that maximizes the expected utility of their time-t profits πj,t = pj,t x εqj,t – vj(x): 
 
(7)  xj,t−1 ≡ argmaxx{Et−1[Uj(pj,t x εqj,t – vj(x))]}. 
 
In (7), Uj(·), vj(·) denote, respectively, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and the 
variable cost function of type-j farmers, and pj,t represents the local price received by producers 
of type j. 
For numerical simulation purposes, the utility function is specialized to the constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) form Uj(π) = − exp(− λj π), where λj is the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion corresponding to type-j farmers.
3 Similarly, the variable cost function is specialized 
to the power form vj(x) = θj,0 
1 , j x
θ , where θj,0 > 0 is a scaling parameter, and θj,1 is the elasticity 
of cost with respect to planned output.
4 Increasing marginal costs require θj,1 > 1; further, θj,1 ≥ 2 
is necessary for marginal costs to rise at an increasing rate. Finally, the local price received by 
type-j farmers is assumed to be stochastically linked to the world price with pj,t = Pt εpj,t, where 
εpj,t > 0 is a random shock. Shock εpj,t represents the imperfections in the transmission of world 
prices to the local market of type-j farmers. 
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Supply by Adopting Farmers when Futures Markets Are Available 
Optimization problem (7) does not provide for futures trading, implicitly assuming that either 
futures markets are not available to adopting farmers, or futures trading costs are too high to 
make it optimal for farmers to participate in the futures markets. To analyze the impact of 
making futures available to adopters, a futures availability scenario is defined as one in which 
they can costlessly hedge using futures contracts. That is, at time t – 1 adopting farmers may 
hedge their time-t crop output by selling hA,t−1 units at the known futures price Ft−1, in which case 
at time t they receive the amount [(Ft−1 − Pt) hA,t−1]. As a result of making futures available to 
adopters, their profits are defined as πA,t = pA,t x εqA,t – vA(x) + (Ft−1 − Pt) hA,t−1, and their expected 
utility maximization problem involves the optimal choice of both planned output xA,t−1 and 
hedging level hA,t−1: 
 
(8) [xA,t−1, hA,t−1] = argmaxx,h{Et−1[UA(pA,t x εqA,t – vA(x) + (Ft−1 − Pt) h)]}. 
 
Note that actual production is uncertain at the time of hedging it, and that the relevant price in 
the futures market is the world crop price Pt, as opposed to the local price pA,t. The lesser the 
adopters’ uncertainty about production and price-transmission shocks (εqA,t and εpA,t, 
respectively), the greater the potential is to reduce their risks by hedging. 
When crop futures are available to adopters, solving the model requires specifying the 
mechanism by which futures prices are formed. For this purpose, futures prices are assumed to 
be equal to the conditional expectation of the next period’s world prices: 
 
(9)  Ft−1 = Et−1(Pt). 
 
Condition (9) rules out the possibility of adopting farmers trading futures for speculative 
purposes. That is, (9) implies that the only incentive for adopters to trade futures contracts is to 
hedge their exposure to price risk. This is a desirable restriction, given the present study’s aim of   8
analyzing the effect of futures availability associated with their usage as risk management tools, 
as opposed to their utilization as instruments for speculation. Otherwise, adopting farmers could 
be made arbitrarily better off if allowed to trade in futures to exploit (expected) speculative 
profitable opportunities. 
 
Expectations and Crop Market Equilibrium 
As pointed out earlier, market equilibrium at time t requires (2) to hold. Given the planned 
output decisions made by farmers at t – 1 (xA,t−1 and xN,t−1) and the actual output shocks at t (εqA,t 
and εqN,t), time-t actual production is obtained from (6). Actual output plus the storage decision 
made by speculators at t – 1 (It) determine total supply at t, as shown in (1). That is, total supply 
at t is determined by agents’ decisions made at t –1 and by date-t output shocks. Given the date-t 
current consumption shock εC,t and expectations about the next-period’s price Et(Pt+1), the 
current price Pt must adjust so that demand for current consumption and speculative storage 
satisfy equilibrium condition (2). 
Clearly, the equilibrium values of current consumption, world prices, and ending stocks 
(
eq
t C , 
eq
t P , and 
eq
t I 1 + , respectively) are affected by the current expectations about next-period’s 
world price Et(Pt+1), because speculative storage demand (i.e., (4) and (5)) is a function of 
Et(Pt+1). Furthermore, the next period’s equilibrium values (i.e., 
eq
t C 1 + , 
eq
t P 1 + , and 
eq
t I 2 + ) are 
functions of the entire probability distribution of the next-period’s world price and the output 
and price-transmission shocks, conditional on the current information. This is true because the 
next-period’s actual output (qj,t+1) depends on the planned output level chosen in the current 
period (xj,t) so as to maximize expected utility (7). Hence, the market equilibrium cannot be 
solved for unless one specifies how farmers and speculative storers form their expectations. 
Here, decision makers are assumed to be rational, in the sense that their subjective 
expectations of the random variables are equal to the objective expectations of such variables 
implied by the model. As in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, ch. 10), the reasons for postulating 
rational expectations are threefold. First, from a practical standpoint, hypothesizing non-rational   9
expectations poses a significant challenge. This is true because there is an infinite number of 
ways in which expectations can be rendered non-rational, and one would be forced to arbitrarily 
choose one from among them. Second, from an analytical perspective, assuming rational 
expectations allows one to focus on the benefits of futures for adopters, arising from their usage 
as a risk-management tool, rather than from their potential to yield informational gains. For 
example, if storers did not have rational price expectations, they could obtain informational gains 
without having to trade futures contracts, by choosing optimal storage levels based on futures 
prices instead of their own (irrational) price expectations. Finally, rational expectations, together 
with (9), eliminate the possibility of obtaining arbitrarily large (expected) speculative gains by 
exploiting informational inefficiencies in the futures market. 
 
Welfare Analysis 
Welfare analysis requires the explicit consideration of agents’ utilities with and without futures, 
and of the corresponding changes in the equilibrium probability density functions (pdfs) of the 
endogenous variables. Here, the welfare effects caused by the availability of futures are 
measured by means of compensating incomes. 
To see how the compensating income of adopting farmers ( A Y ) is calculated, consider 
two thought experiments. In experiment 1, futures are not available before random time t, but 
starting at that time they are made available to adopters forever. In experiment 2, the scenario is 
similar to that of experiment 1, with the difference that starting at time t adopters are given a 
certain amount of income YA in each period, forever, instead of allowing them to trade in futures. 
Define scalars  A U  and  ) ( A A Y U  as adopters’ unconditional expected utility under experiments 1 
and 2, respectively.
5 The certain per-period income  A Y  defined by the equality  A U  =  ) ( A A Y U  
represents the amount that makes adopters indifferent between using and not using futures. 
The effect of futures availability on non-adopting farmers can be similarly measured by 
non-adopters’ compensating income ( N Y ). It is worth pointing out that  N Y  only includes 
compensation for the pdf changes induced by adopters’ use of futures, as non-adopters never   10
trade futures by construction. In contrast,  A Y  involves compensation for such pdf changes, as 
well as for preventing adopters from employing futures. 
To measure consumer compensating income ( C Y ), note that demand schedule (3) can be 
derived by assuming a representative consumer characterized by the quasilinear utility function 
UC(Ct, Zt) ≡ 
1 / 1
0
δ δ  
1 / 1 1 δ −
t C /(1 – 1/δ1) + Zt subject to the budget constraint Wt = Pt Ct + PZ,t Zt, 
where Zt denotes a composite good, PZ,t is its price, and Wt is the consumer’s wealth. Using the 
budget constraint to obtain Zt = Wt/PZ,t – Pt/PZ,t Ct, and plugging the resulting expression into the 
utility function to get UC(Ct, Wt/PZ,t – Pt/PZ,t Ct) ≡ 
1 / 1
0
δ δ  
1 / 1 1 δ −
t C /(1 – 1/δ1) + Wt/PZ,t – Pt/PZ,t Ct, 
the first-order necessary condition (FOC) corresponding to optimal commodity consumption is 
t C C U ∂ ∂
∗ / =  
1 / 1
0
δ δ  
1 / 1 δ − ∗
t C  – Pt/PZ,t = 0. It is straightforward to derive demand function (3) from 




t Z P . Further, by plugging the FOC back into the utility function and 
rearranging, consumer surplus can be expressed as UC(
∗
t C , Wt/PZ,t – Pt/PZ,t 
∗
t C ) ≡ 
1 / 1
0
δ δ  
1 / 1 1 δ − ∗
t C /(δ1 – 1) + Wt/PZ,t. Therefore, consumer compensating income is computed as  C Y  =  C U  − 
C U , where  C U  and  C U  represent mean consumer surplus under thought experiments 1 and 2, 
respectively. Like  N Y ,  C Y  only measures compensation for the pdf changes induced by the 
adopting farmers’ use of futures. 
 
Numerical Methods 
To analyze the behavior of equilibrium endogenous variables (e.g., prices) in the model 
introduced in the preceding section, one must first solve for the market equilibrium conditions 
under each possible state of the world. This is not a trivial task, because the model has no closed-
form solution and is highly nonlinear. Here, the model is solved using the method developed by 
Williams and Wright (Judd 1998, ch. 12 and 17). The essence of this method consists of 
estimating the function  ) ( ˆ ⋅ Ψ  that approximates the price expectation conditional on information 
at time t as a function of time-t carry-over storage, i.e., Et(Pt+1) = Ψ(It+1). The rationale for the 
latter equality is that Et(Pt+1) can only depend on information available at time t, and current 
optimal storage It+1 must incorporate all such information.   11
The computer algorithm is sketched in Williams and Wright (1991, ch. 3). Cubic splines 
are used for the function approximant  ) ( ˆ ⋅ Ψ , and the pdfs of the exogenous random shocks are 
approximated by Gaussian quadrature (Judd 1998). The cubic spline interpolation used is based 
on 63 nodes, which are more densily distributed over the range where  ) ( ˆ ⋅ Ψ  exhibits the greatest 
nonlinearities in order to achieve greater accuracy. The Gaussian quadrature scheme relies on 
three nodes for each exogenous random variable. The number of nodes is chosen to obtain an 
acceptable level of accuracy, while maintaining computational feasibility. The cubic spline 
interpolation and Gaussian quadrature schemes are calculated by means of the programming 
language MATLAB version 7.0, using the computer routines developed by Miranda and Fackler. 
 
Model Parameterization 
The postulated model is highly stylized, as it is intended to capture key features common to 
agricultural commodity markets in general. For policy analysis, however, the model is most 
useful when parameterized to represent specific market scenarios. To demonstrate how it can be 
used to draw inferences about the effects of adopting futures, we have set its parameter values so 
as to simulate the natural rubber market. Parameter values corresponding to the natural rubber 
market can be obtained from previous studies or calibrated to match key measures reported in the 
literature. 
The parameterization used to represent the natural rubber market, as well as the sources it 
is based on, are reported in table 1. The values for the scaling parameters (nA, nN, δ0, θA,0, and 
θN,0) and the means of the exogenous price-transmission shocks (Mean(εpA,t) and Mean(εpN,t)) are 
assigned so as to scale the units of measurement of the present system of equations around the 
unit value. This is achieved by setting δ0 = Mean(εpA,t) = Mean(εpN,t) = 1, θA,0 = 1/θA,1, and θN,0 = 
1/θN,1, and by scaling the numbers of adopting and non-adopting farmers so that nA + nN = 1. 
Scaling enhances the accuracy of the numerical solutions by avoiding the computation of 
variables whose orders of magnitude are substantially different (Judd 1998, ch. 2). The 
advocated scaling implies that the equilibrium values of adopter output, non-adopter output,   12
current consumption, and prices all equal one when all exogenous random variables are fixed at 
their mean values for all dates t. That is, if all exogenous random variables were fixed at their 
mean values at all times, equilibrium in the scaled model would be characterized by qA,t = qN,t = 
Ct = Pt = pA,t = pN,t = 1 for all t. In such non-stochastic equilibrium, total output would also equal 
one (nA qA,t + nN qN,t = 1 for all t), and storage would be zero (i.e., It+1 = 0 for all t). Besides being 
important for improving numerical accuracy, scaling has the advantage of facilitating the 
interpretation of results. For example, the results in tables 2 through 4 correspond to stochastic 
scenarios. Hence, comparing them with the non-stochastic benchmark allows one to easily infer 
the impact of introducing randomness into the system. 
Following Zant (2001), the observation period (i.e., the time elapsed between t and t + 1) 
for the simulations is set equal to three months. The values used for the elasticity of demand (δ1 
= 0.25), the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (λj = 4.7), the elasticity of production costs (θj,1 
= 2), the quarterly variable storage costs (φ = 0.009), and the quarterly interest rate (r = 0.015) 
are consistent not only with the natural rubber market, but also with the values used in studies of 
other agricultural commodities. For example, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, p. 295) and Williams 
and Wright (1991, p. 38) use annual storage costs of φ = 0.02, and the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion of 3.1 implied by λj = 4.7 is well within the range considered typical by Gollier (2001, 
pp. 31 and 289) and Kocherlakota (1996). 
The exogenous random shocks (εC,t, εqj,t, and εpj,t) are assumed to be independently and 
identically log-normally distributed because they must be positive. The standard deviations 
(StDs) of the exogenous random shocks represent the respective coefficients of variation (CVs), 
as well, because their means equal one. StD(εC,t) = CV(εC,t) = 0.158 is the only figure not taken 
from previous studies, but is the value required for the simulations to yield CV(Pt) = 23%, which 
is the CV of the world price of natural rubber implied by the data in Zant (2001, p. 709). CV(Pt) 
= 23% is consistent historical values for agricultural commodities in general (see Newbery and 
Stiglitz 1981, p. 291).   13
For the simulations representing the case of futures being adopted by relatively few 
farmers, the numbers of adopters and non-adopters are set at n
A = 0.1 and  n
N = 0.9, respectively. 
In other words, such simulations assume that adopters account for 10% of world output. In the 
case of natural rubber, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India are the top four producing 
countries and account for approximately 33%, 24%, 13%, and 8%, respectively, of world output 
(FAO). Hence, the low-adoption scenario would be similar to having producers in India or 
Malaysia adopt futures. The alternative scenario of a relatively widespread adoption of futures is 
run by employing n
A = 0.75 and  n
N = 0.25. This case of a 75% market share corresponding to 
adopters would be comparable to having futures adopted by natural rubber producers in all top 
four producing countries (i.e., Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India). 
 
Results and Discussion 
The simulations provide insights on the impact of futures adoption at two different levels, 
namely, the effect on the world market for the crop, and the influence on the behaviors of 
adopters and non-adopters. Both levels of analysis are relevant, but they are conceptually 
different. Hence, they are addressed separately in the next subsections. 
 
Market Effects 
Steady-state results regarding market-level effects are summarized in table 2. The table reports 
the means, standard deviations, medians, and the 5% and 95% quantiles of the endogenous 
market variables under alternative scenarios. The second (fourth) column shows results for the 
futures-availability scenario assuming a small (large) share of adopters. For example, the “World 
Price” figures in the first column indicate that when futures are not available and nA = 0.1, the 
unconditional distribution of world prices has a mean of 1.165, a standard deviation of 0.270, a 
median of 1.115, and a 5% (95%) quantile of 0.962 (1.430). According to the corresponding 
figures in the second column, making futures available induces reductions in the mean, standard 
deviation, median, and 5% and 95% quantiles of 0.4% (from 1.165 to 1.160), 2.2% (from 0.270   14
to 0.264), 0.4% (from 1.115 to 1.111), 0.1% (from 0.962 to 0.961), and 1.3% (from 1.430 to 
1.411), respectively. 
Recall that the scaling adopted for the simulations implies that in the non-stochastic 
benchmark scenario, total output, total supply, total consumption, price, and consumption 
expenditures all equal unity, and storage is zero. Hence, the first and third columns in table 2 
show that the introduction of randomness into the non-stochastic economy reduces mean output 
and consumption by 3.3%, while increasing total supply by slightly over 40%. The latter occurs 
because mean storage increases from zero to almost 50% of mean output. In addition, random 
exogenous shocks cause the mean (median) world price to go up by approximately 17% (12%), 
and mean (median) consumption expenditures to rise by about 12% (8.5%). In the case of total 
supply, storage, prices, and consumption expenditures, there are substantial differences between 
means and medians, as well as noticeable asymmetries in the location of the 5% and 95% 
quantiles indicative of pdfs strongly skewed to the right. In other words, supply, storage, prices, 
and consumption expenditures tend to be at relatively low levels most of the time, but on a few 
occasions they achieve quite high magnitudes. In contrast, the pdfs of current consumption are 
slightly skewed to the left, and the pdfs of total output are essentially symmetric. 
Turning to the market-level changes induced by the availability of futures, it is apparent 
from the comparison of the first and second columns of table 2 that such changes are modest but 
not necessarily negligible, even when the market share of adopters is as small as 10%. When nA 
= 0.1, futures availability reduces the means of total supply, storage, prices, and consumption 
expenditures by 0.2%, 0.9%, 0.4%, and 0.3%, respectively, but increases the means of both total 
output and consumption by 0.1%. Futures availability also reduces the standard deviations of 
total supply, consumption, storage, prices, and consumption expenditures by 0.6%, 1.6%, 0.6%, 
2.2%, and 2.1%, respectively, but increases the standard deviation of output by 1%. 
Comparison of the second and fourth columns of table 2 reveals that futures availability 
exerts the same qualitative effects when the share of adopters is large (nA = 0.75) as when that 
share is small (nA = 0.1). However, in percentage terms, the magnitudes of the changes in means   15
and standard deviations induced by futures availability in the large-adopter-share scenario are 
approximately five times the ones corresponding to the small-adopter-share scenario. For nA = 
0.75, making futures available causes the means of total supply, storage, prices, and consumption 
expenditures to decline by 1.1%, 4.6%, 2.4%, and 1.8%, respectively, and the means of both 
total output and consumption to increase by 0.5%. As a result of futures adoption, the standard 
deviations of total supply, consumption, storage, prices, and consumption expenditures fall by 
3.5%, 8.3%, 3.2%, 11.2%, and 10.4%, respectively, and the standard deviation of output goes up 
by 9.3%. These findings indicate that the market-level effects induced by a large proportion of 
producers adopting futures can be substantial. 
 
Effects on the Behaviors of Adopters and Non-Adopters 
Farm-level results corresponding to adopters and non-adopters are shown in tables 3 and 4, 
respectively. Data in these tables are reported in the same format as in table 2. The numbers in 
tables 3 and 4 can also be interpreted in relation to the equilibrium values corresponding to 
exogenous shocks fixed at their mean values for all periods. For example, the first column of 
table 3 shows that for nA = 0.1, the existence of exogenous random shocks causes adopters to 
reduce the means of planned and actual output by 4.1% (from 1 to 0.959), while increasing mean 
profits by 32.6% (from 0.5 to 0.663).
6 
Table 3 demonstrates that the farm-level impact of futures availability on adopters is 
substantial, regardless of whether they account for a small or a large share of total output. 
Futures availability causes the means of planned and actual output to increase by 3.3% (from 
0.959 to 0.991) when nA = 0.1, and by 1.2% (from 0.967 to 0.978) when nA = 0.75. In addition, 
when adopters are allowed to hedge, their production plans become considerably more 
responsive to expected market conditions. For nA = 0.1 (0.75), this is reflected in a standard 
deviation of planned output that is 56.9% (27.0%) higher when futures are available, even 
though the standard deviation of local prices is 1.6% (8.1%) smaller. Adopters hedge a 
substantial proportion of their planned output if allowed to do so. The mean hedge equals 82%   16
(68.4%) of the mean planned output when nA = 0.1 (0.75). When the adopters’ share is large, 
their hedge is noticeably smaller due to the greater effectiveness of the “natural” hedge (i.e., the 
hedge induced by the negative response of world prices to the output shocks experienced by 
adopters). 
The increase in the level and responsiveness of output by adopters causes a reduction in 
the mean and the standard deviation of the world price (see table 2), which in turn implies a 
smaller mean and standard deviation for the local price (e.g., for nA = 0.75, they fall from 1.167 
and 0.334 to 113.9 and 0.307, respectively). As a result, futures availability is associated with 
slightly larger mean total profits when adopter share is small (0.665 compared to 0.663), but 
lower mean total profits when adopter share is large (0.639 compared to 0.664). Regardless of 
the market share accounted for by adopting farmers, hedging greatly reduces the standard 
deviation of adopters’ total profits (from 0.345 to 0.269 for nA = 0.1, and from 0.332 to 0.243 for 
nA = 0.75). 
The results reported in table 4 indicate that the availability of futures to adopters also 
impacts non-adopters’ farm-level endogenous variables, even if the market share of adopting 
farmers is as small as 10%. The availability of futures to adopters induces a leftward shift in the 
pdfs of non-adopters’ planned output, actual output, local price, and profits, as well as a 
reduction in their standard deviations. In response to adopters’ use of futures, non-adopters 
reduce average planned output by 0.3% (from 0.967 to 0.964) when nA = 0.1, and by 1.3% (from 
0.962 to 0.949) when nA = 0.75. At the same time, the standard deviation of planned output falls 
by 2.6% (from 0.057 to 0.055) and 13.2% (from 0.053 to 0.046) when adopters’ shares are small 
and large, respectively. The latter effect is a consequence of lower price volatility, as futures 
availability reduces the standard deviation of local prices from 0.336 to 0.330 when nA = 0.1, and 
from 0.334 to 0.307 when nA = 0.75. 
Given the smaller mean output and the lower mean price received by non-adopters, it is 
not surprising that their mean profits fall (from 0.662 to 0.656 and from 0.665 to 0.634 when 
adopters have small and large market shares, respectively) as futures become available. Futures   17
availability is also associated with a reduction in the standard deviation of non-adopter profits 
(from 0.330 to 0.324 when nA = 0.1, and from 0.341 to 0.307 when nA = 0.75), which stems 
mostly from the declines in the standard deviations both of prices and planned output. 
 
Effects on Welfare 
Welfare is ultimately a function of the level, volatility, and higher moments of the endogenous 
pdfs. From the results reported in table 2, it seems sensible to infer that consumers gain by 
making futures available to producers, as mean consumption increases, mean consumption 
expenditures decreases, and the standard deviations of both consumption and consumption 
expenditures fall. The plot of consumer compensating income ( C Y ) depicted in figure 1 confirms 
this intuition. Consumer compensating income is  C Y  = 0.005 when nA = 0.1, and  C Y  = 0.027 
when nA = 0.75. Such gains amount to 0.4% and 2.4%, respectively, of mean consumption 
expenditures before adoption. 
Figure 1 shows that consumer compensating income is always positive and 
monotonically increasing with the market share of adopting farmers. Consumer compensating 
income tends to zero as nA → 0, because in such an instance the share of adopters is so small that 
their use of futures does not change the equilibrium pdfs of the market-level endogenous 
variables. The larger the proportion of adopters, the larger their impact on equilibrium pdfs and, 
consequently, the greater their effect on consumer compensating income. At the extreme, where 
all producers adopt futures (nA = 1), consumer compensating income equals  C Y  = 0.031, or 2.8% 
of the mean consumption expenditures before adoption. 
Figure 1 depicts producer compensating incomes, as well. It is clear from the graph that 
non-adopters lose as a result of making futures available to adopters. Non-adopter compensating 
variation equals  N Y  = −0.003 (−0.015) when nA = 0.1 (0.75), which amounts to 0.4% (2.2%) of 
non-adopters’ mean profits when futures are not available. Figure 1 also shows that the negative 
impact of futures availability on non-adopter welfare increases monotonically with the market 
share of adopters. The polar case of a negligible number of adopters (nA → 0) yields no welfare   18
losses for non-adopting farmers. This result is to be expected because, as mentioned earlier,  N Y  
measures only the compensation for the pdf changes induced by the adoption of futures, and pdfs 
remain essentially unaltered if adopters account for a negligible market share. At the other polar 
case, where virtually all producers are adopters (nA → 1), futures availability induces a very 
large change in equilibrium pdfs. In turn, such change involves a welfare loss equivalent to 2.6% 
of non-adopters’ mean profits when futures are not available ( N Y  = −0.017) for the few farmers 
who do not adopt. 
Figure 1 shows that futures availability is associated with welfare gains for adopters if 
their market share is below nA = 0.71, and with welfare losses otherwise. Further, adopters’ 
welfare gains (losses) decrease (increase) monotonically with their market share. For the nA = 0.1 
and nA = 0.75 scenarios reported in table 3, adopters’ compensating incomes are  A Y  = 0.016 and 
A Y  = −0.001, respectively. In terms of adopters’ mean profits when futures are not available, 
such figures represent a gain of 2.5% and a loss of 0.1%, respectively. Although it seems 
counterintuitive to have an expanded choice set (i.e., allowing for hedging) yielding a welfare 
loss, such a result is possible because of the combined assumptions of perfect competition and 
market clearing. Due to perfect competition, it is in each individual adopter’s best interest to 
hedge and to modify his output decisions accordingly. However, the collective impact of such 
decisions on the market renders every adopting farmer worse off when the share of adopters is 
sufficiently large (i.e., when nA > 0.71). 
In summary, the availability of futures affects the welfare of adopting producers both at 
the individual and the collective levels. At the individual level, futures allow each adopter to 
better hedge his risks. At the collective level, futures availability affects the equilibrium price 
pdf because of the changes in output decisions induced by hedging. The extreme case of nA → 0 
represents the situation where adopters account for a negligible share of the market, in which 
case there is no collective effect from the adoption of futures. Hence, the value of  A Y  = 0.020 for 
nA → 0 represents the welfare impact solely due to the enhanced adopters’ decisions associated 
with the availability of futures. As the market share of adopters goes up, however, the collective   19
effect becomes increasingly important. In the presence of an inelastic world demand, the rise in 
adopter output induced by the availability of futures tends to reduce mean profits for adopters as 
their market share increases. Futures availability also makes adopters more responsive to market 
conditions, which reduces the standard deviation of prices as the adopters’ market share grows. 
Overall, however, when the adopter market share is sufficiently large (i.e., nA > 0.71), the 
negative welfare impact due to the reduction in mean prices outweighs the positive welfare 
impact from the individual effect and the reduced standard deviation of prices. 
For completeness, figure 1 also depicts aggregate producer compensating income, 
obtained by weighing the compensating incomes of adopters and non-adopters by their 
respective market shares (i.e., nA  A Y  + nN  N Y ). The graph shows that futures availability 
unambiguously makes farmers as a whole worse off, the more so the larger the market share of 
adopters. However, consumer compensating income is positive and large enough to compensate 
for producer welfare losses and yield a net gain in welfare for society as a whole. Further, 
societal welfare gains increase monotonically with the number of adopting farmers. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Recent years have brought a renewed interest in market-based solutions to alleviate some of the 
risks faced by commodity producers. However, to date, little has been done in terms of 
concomitant research. The present study aims at partially filling this gap by showing how to use 
a simulation approach to analyze the market-level effects of making a futures market available to 
producers of a storable commodity, as well as the impacts of this on producer behavior and 
consumer and producer welfare. Key features of the proposed model are the explicit 
consideration of dynamic impacts due to inventories, and of aggregate market effects associated 
with the adoption of futures by a group of producers. 
The advocated model is applied to analyze the impact of making futures available to 
natural rubber producers. It is found that the market-level changes induced by the availability of 
futures are modest, but not negligible, if the adopters’ market share is small, and that some of   20
such changes can be noticeable if the proportion of producers adopting futures is large. The 
effect of futures availability is greater on the standard deviation than on the means of the market-
level endogenous variables. 
Futures availability clearly impacts adopters’ farm-level variables, regardless of whether 
adopters account for a small or a large share of total output. The availability of futures also 
impacts the behavior of non-adopters, even if the market share of adopting farmers is relatively 
small. In terms of welfare, consumers clearly benefit from the adoption of futures by producers. 
The change in consumer welfare is always positive and monotonically increasing with the 
market share of adopting farmers. Non-adopters always lose when futures are made available to 
adopters. Such a loss increases monotonically with the proportion of adopters, and is sizeable if 
most producers adopt futures. Futures availability is associated with noticeable welfare gains for 
adopters when their market share is small, and with losses when they account for a sufficiently 
large portion of the market. On the aggregate, futures availability unambiguously makes farmers 
worse off, the more so the larger the market share of adopters. For society as a whole, however, 
futures availability yields a net gain because consumer gains outweigh producer losses, and such 
societal net gains increase as adoption becomes more widespread. 
Overall, our findings suggest that there is no basis for advocating the use of futures as a 
means to improve commodity producers’ well-being. The reasons for this assertion are that 
producers as a whole lose from making futures available and, more importantly, that futures 
availability reduces welfare even for adopters, provided the market share of the latter is 
sufficiently large. 
From a policy perspective, the present study raises interesting issues. One of them is that 
measuring the success of a policy aimed at making futures available to improve producer welfare 
by the extent of adoption is likely to be misleading. This is true because our results suggest that 
adopter welfare decreases monotonically with the share of adopters. Another issue is associated 
with the finding that futures availability enhances consumer welfare, but reduces aggregate 
producer welfare. When coupled with the fact that many agricultural commodities tend to be   21
produced in developing countries and consumed in developed economies, this implies that the 
push by international organizations (e.g., ITF) to improve the availability of futures among 
producers may ultimately enhance the lot of consumers in developed economies, while reducing 
the welfare of producers in developing countries. To many, this regressive redistributional 
outcome is likely to be both surprising and undesirable. 
Under suitable modifications, the modeling framework presented here could be applied to 
analyze other important situations involving risks, such as yield insurance or revenue insurance 
contracts. As with any theoretical construct, the usefulness of the model for policy analysis 
depends on the realism of its underlying assumptions. In this regard, is important to note that our 
model is subject to William’s criticism, in that it does not “ … include imperfect spot and 
forward markets, long-term relationships as an enforcement mechanisms, prices not indicated to 
the public, prices that in any case anticipate later disputes about delivery conditions, grade, and 
payment” (Williams 2001, p. 759). It remains for future work to determine whether 
incorporating such features can substantially alter the present conclusions. Making the present 
model more realistic without rendering it computationally intractable constitutes an interesting 
research challenge.   22
Notes 
1. δ0 = δ0 and Mean(εC,t) = 1 is equivalent to setting δ0 = δ0/y and Mean(εC,t) = y for any y > 0. 
2. Since xj,t−1 ≡ Et−1(qj,t) = Et−1(xj,t−1 εqj,t) = xj,t−1 Et−1(εqj,t), it must be the case that Et−1(εqj,t) = 1. 
Mean(εqj,t) = 1 then follows immediately by application of the law of iterated expectations. 
3. The analysis by Černý (2004) implies that the results from the present model should be robust 
to changes in the specification of the utility function, as long as the levels of relative risk 
aversion (defined as −π U”( π)/U’(π)) are kept similar and the risks involved are neither too 
large nor too asymmetric. 
4. As for utility, results should not be sensitive to modifications in the production function, 
provided the levels of x v’(x)/v”(x) are about the same and the risks are neither very large nor 
very skewed. 
5. It should be clear that  A U  is obtained by using the no-futures pdf, as experiment 2 prevents 
producers from using futures. In contrast, computation of  ) ( A A Y U  involves the no-futures pdf for 
dates before t, and the pdf corresponding to the futures-availability scenario for dates t and after. 
6. In the nonstochastic equilibrium, πA,t ≡ pA,t qA,t – vA(xA,t−1) = 1 × 1 − vA(1) = 0.5 ∀ t because 
[pA,t, xA,t−1, qA,t] = [1, 1, 1] ∀ t. 
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Table 1. Parameter Values Corresponding to Natural Rubber Market Simulations 
 
Parameter   Source 
Demand:  δ0 = 1  Imposed by scaling convention. 
  δ1 = 0.25  Based on Burger and Smit (2001).
a 
Absolute Risk Aversion:  λj = 4.7, j = A, N  Zant (2001, p. 700).
b 
Production Cost:  θj,0 = 1/θj,1, j = A, N  Imposed by scaling convention. 
  θj,1 = 2, j = A, N  Zant (2001, p. 696). 
Storage Cost:  φ = 0.009   Dealers’ quarterly storage costs 
reported in Zant (2001, p. 700). 
Interest Rate:  r = 0.015  Zant 2001 (p. 709). 
Demand Shocks:  Mean(εC,t) = 1, j = A, N Imposed  by  definition. 
  StD(εC,t) = 0.158, j = A, N Obtained by calibration.
c 
Output Shocks:  Mean(εqj,t) = 1, j = A, N Imposed  by  definition. 
  StD(εqj,t) = 0.07, j = A, N Smallest  coefficient of variation (CV) 
in Table 3 of Priyadarshan et al. (2005). 
Price-Transmission Shocks:  Mean(εpj,t) = 1, j = A, N  Imposed by scaling convention. 
  StD(εpj,t) = 0.167, j = A, N Required for Corr(Pt, pj,t) = 0.8 as 
reported in ITF (2001, p. 17).
d 
aBurger and Smit (2001) report demand elasticity equal to 0.05 from monthly data. Given the observation 
period of one quarter used here, the demand elasticity is increased to δ1 = 0.25. 
bZant (2001, p. 700) uses λj = 3.1/Mean(πj,t). Here, λj = 3.1/ 0.66 = 4.7 because Mean(πj,t) = 0.66 for the 
scenarios without futures (see tables 3 and 4 below). 
cThe data in Zant (2001, p. 709) implies CV(Pt) ≡ StD(Pt)/Mean(Pt) equal to 23% (= [0.000272353/(1 − 
0.813645
2)]
0.5/[0.023216/(1 − 0.813645)]). StD(εC,t) is calibrated so as to yield CV(Pt) = 23% for the 
scenarios without futures (see tables 3 and 4 below). 
dCorr(Pt, pj,t) denotes the correlation between Pt and pj,t. For arbitrary independent random variables y and 




−1/2. For Corr(Pt, Pt εpj,t) = 0.8 and CV(Pt) = 23%, this implies StD(εpj,t) = 0.167.   27
Table 2. Steady-State Statistics for Market-Level Endogenous Random Variables 
 
  Small Share of Adopting Farmers 
(nA = 0.1, nN = 0.9) 
  Large Share of Adopting Farmers 
(nA = 0.75, nN = 0.25) 












        
Total Output (nA qA,t + nN qN,t)  96.7 (8.3)  96.8 (8.4)  96.7 (7.7)  97.2 (8.4) 
  [83.3, 96.6, 110.3]  [83.3, 96.6, 110.6]  [84.2, 96.6, 109.0]  [84.1, 96.8, 111.3]          
Total Supply (nA qA,t + nN qN,t + It)  143.9 (54.5)  143.6 (54.1)  143.0 (54.0)  141.4 (52.1) 
  [93.1, 135.1, 216.3]  [93.3, 134.9, 215.2]  [93.0, 134.3, 214.3]  [94.0, 133.1, 208.4]          
Current Consumption (Ct)  96.7 (3.8)  96.8 (3.7)  96.7 (3.8)  97.2 (3.5) 
  [91.4, 97.3, 101.0]  [91.8, 97.4, 101.0]  [91.4, 97.3, 100.9]  [93.0, 97.7, 101.0]          
Storage (It+1)  47.2 (51.9)  46.8 (51.6)  46.3 (51.5)  44.2 (49.8) 
  [1.6, 37.8, 115.3]  [1.5, 37.5, 114.2]  [1.5, 37.0, 113.3]  [1.0, 35.4, 107.4]          
World Price (Pt)  116.5 (27.0)  116.0 (26.4)  116.7 (26.8)  113.9 (23.8) 
  [96.2, 111.5, 143.0]  [96.1, 111.1, 141.1]  [96.4, 111.8, 143.3]  [95.9, 109.7, 133.4]          
Consumption Expenditures (Pt Ct)  111.7 (17.4)  111.4 (17.0)  111.9 (17.3)  109.9 (15.5) 
  [97.1, 108.5, 130.8]  [97.0, 108.2, 129.5]  [97.3, 108.7, 131.0]  [96.9, 107.2, 124.2]          
Note: Stand-alone numbers denote means, numbers within parentheses are standard deviations, and the three numbers within brackets are, 
respectively, the 5 percent quantile, the median, and the 95 percent quantile. Unconditional pdfs are based on the Monte Carlo simulation of 
25,000 time series of 2,000 observations each. To avoid dependence on initial conditions, the first 1,000 observations from each series are 
discarded. The reported unconditional point statistics are estimated from a total of 2.5 × 10
7 simulated observations, so that the number of reported 
digits is consistent with an estimated confidence level of at least 95%. Antithetic acceleration (Geweke 1988) is used to improve efficiency, and 
“common random numbers” are employed to enhance accuracy in the comparison across alternative scenarios (i.e., all scenarios are based on the 
same simulated series of exogenous random variables). 
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Table 3. Steady-State Statistics for Endogenous Random Variables Corresponding to Adopting Farmers 
 
  Small Share of Adopting Farmers 
(nA = 0.1, nN = 0.9) 
  Large Share of Adopting Farmers 
(nA = 0.75, nN = 0.25) 












        
Planned Output (xA,t)  95.9 (5.3)  99.1 (8.3)  96.7 (5.6)  97.8 (7.1) 
  [87.0, 96.4, 103.7]  [87.5, 98.0, 116.0]  [87.4, 97.1, 105.3]  [87.4, 97.0, 111.4]          
Actual Output (qA,t)  95.9 (8.5)  99.1 (10.8)  96.7 (8.8)  97.8 (9.9) 
  [82.3, 95.8, 110.0]  [83.0, 98.2, 118.3]  [82.7, 96.6, 111.2]  [82.7, 97.3, 114.9]          
Hedging (hA,t)    81.3 (3.6)    66.9 (6.1) 
   [75.5,  81.9,  87.5]  [59.1,  65.5,  79.4]          
Local Crop Price (pA,t)  116.5 (33.6)  116.0 (33.0)  116.7 (33.4)  113.9 (30.7) 
  [80.5, 111.4, 163.8]  [80.4, 111.1, 162.6]  [80.7, 111.7, 164.2]  [79.8, 109.5, 157.6]          
Crop Profits [pA,t qA,t – vA(xA,t−1)]  66.3 (34.5)  66.5 (36.2)  66.4 (33.2)  63.9 (31.2) 
  [29.9, 60.6, 115.9]  [29.4, 60.4, 118.0]  [30.5, 61.1, 115.0]  [29.5, 59.0, 109.6]          
Hedging Profits [(Ft−1 − Pt) hA,t]    0.0 (19.7)    0.0 (15.9) 
   [ −15.7, 1.8, 17.7]    [−10.9, 1.5, 13.9]          
Total Profits (Crop Prof. + Hedging Prof.) 66.3 (34.5)  66.5 (26.9)  66.4 (33.2)  63.9 (24.3) 
  [29.9, 60.6, 115.9]  [31.4, 62.7, 114.2]  [30.5, 61.1, 115.0]  [30.9, 60.8, 106.9]          
Note: Stand-alone numbers denote means, numbers within parentheses are standard deviations, and the three numbers within brackets are, 
respectively, the 5 percent quantile, the median, and the 95 percent quantile. Unconditional pdfs are based on the Monte Carlo simulation of 
25,000 time series of 2,000 observations each. To avoid dependence on initial conditions, the first 1,000 observations from each series are 
discarded. The reported unconditional point statistics are estimated from a total of 2.5 × 10
7 simulated observations, so that the number of reported 
digits is consistent with an estimated confidence level of at least 95%. Antithetic acceleration (Geweke 1988) is used to improve efficiency, and 
“common random numbers” are employed to enhance accuracy in the comparison across alternative scenarios (i.e., all scenarios are based on the 
same simulated series of exogenous random variables). 
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Table 4. Steady-State Statistics for Endogenous Random Variables Corresponding to Non-Adopting Farmers 
 
  Small Share of Adopting Farmers 
(nA = 0.1, nN = 0.9) 
  Large Share of Adopting Farmers 
(nA = 0.75, nN = 0.25) 












        
Planned Output (xN,t)  96.7 (5.7)  96.4 (5.5)  96.2 (5.3)  94.9 (4.6) 
  [87.2, 97.1, 105.4]  [87.2, 96.8, 104.8]  [87.2, 96.6, 104.2]  [86.9, 95.6, 101.0]          
Actual Output (qN,t)  96.7 (8.8)  96.4 (8.7)  96.2 (8.6)  94.9 (8.1) 
  [82.6, 96.6, 111.3]  [82.6, 96.3, 110.9]  [82.5, 96.1, 110.4]  [82.0, 94.8, 108.2]          
Local Crop Price (pN,t)  116.5 (33.6)  116.0 (33.0)  116.7 (33.4)  113.9 (30.7) 
  [80.5, 111.4, 163.8]  [80.4, 111.1, 162.6]  [80.7, 111.7, 164.2]  [79.8, 109.5, 157.6]          
Profits [pN,t qN,t – vN(xN,t−1)]  66.2 (33.0)  65.6 (32.4)  66.5 (34.1)  63.4 (30.7) 
  [30.5, 60.9, 114.4]  [30.3, 60.5, 112.9]  [30.2, 60.9, 116.0]  [29.4, 58.7, 108.3]          
Note: Stand-alone numbers denote means, numbers within parentheses are standard deviations, and the three numbers within brackets are, 
respectively, the 5 percent quantile, the median, and the 95 percent quantile. Unconditional pdfs are based on the Monte Carlo simulation of 
25,000 time series of 2,000 observations each. To avoid dependence on initial conditions, the first 1,000 observations from each series are 
discarded. The reported unconditional point statistics are estimated from a total of 2.5 × 10
7 simulated observations, so that the number of reported 
digits is consistent with an estimated confidence level of at least 95%. Antithetic acceleration (Geweke 1988) is used to improve efficiency, and 
“common random numbers” are employed to enhance accuracy in the comparison across alternative scenarios (i.e., all scenarios are based on the 
same simulated series of exogenous random variables). 
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Figure 1. Compensating Incomes Associated with Futures Availability 
 
Note: To put the magnitudes of compensating income in perspective, note that when futures are not available median consumption expenditures are about 1.086 
(see last row of table 2), median profits for adopting farmers are around 0.608 (see last row of table 3), and median profits for non-adopting farmers are 
approximately 0.609 (see last row of table 4). 